Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Ron Patterson v. Randy D. Patterson : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
L. Miles LeBaron, Tyler J. Jensen, Jacob D. Briggs; Lebaron and Jensen; attorneys for appellees.
James C. Jenkins, Jeremy S. Raymond; Olson and Hoggan; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Ron Patterson v. Randy D. Patterson, No. 20100011 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2113

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

RON PATTERSON,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff, Petitioner, and
Appellee,
v.
RANDY D. PATTERSON, as Trustee of
the Darlene Patterson Family Protection
Trust;
ESTATE OF
DARLENE
PATTERSON; JUDY ANN HENRY;
RANDY D. PATTERSON; GARY E.
PATTERSON; REX A. PETTERSON;
VICKY D. ROMERO; RICKY A.
PATTERSON; and/ or JOHN DOES 1-10
and JANE DOES 1-10,

Appeal No. 20100011-SC
District Court No. 070700586

Defendants, Respondents
and Appellants,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER AND RULING
ENTERED BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN PRESIDING
L. Miles LeBaron
Tyler J. Jensen
Jacob D. Briggs
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
476 West Heritage Park Blvd Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (435)752-2610
Attorneys for Appellee

James C. Jenkins (#1658)
Jeffery B.Adair (#8713)
Jeremy S. Raymond (#12635)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
130 South Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (435)752-1551
Attorneys for Appellant Randy
Patterson, both individually and
as Trustee
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
RON PATTERSON,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff, Petitioner, and
Appellee,
v.
RANDY D. PATTERSON, as Trustee of
the Darlene Patterson Family Protection
Trust; ESTATE OF DARLENE
PATTERSON; JUDY ANN HENRY;
RANDY D. PATTERSON; GARY E.
PATTERSON; REX A. PETTERSON;
VICKY D. ROMERO; RICKY A.
PATTERSON; and/ or JOHN DOES 1-10
and JANE DOES 1-10,

Appeal No. 20100011-SC
District Court No. 070700586

Defendants, Respondents
and Appellants,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER AND RULING
ENTERED BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN PRESIDING
L. Miles LeBaron
Tyler J. Jensen
Jacob D. Briggs
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
476 West Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (435)752-2610
A ttorneys for Appellee

James C. Jenkins (#1658)
Jeffery B. Adair (#8713)
Jeremy S. Raymond (#12635)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
130 South Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone: (435)752-1551
A ttorneys for Appellant Randy
Patterson, both individually and
as Trustee
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

CLARIFICATION OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW

1

ARGUMENT

1

I.

II.

III.

THE FAMILY TRUST AND TRUST RESTATEMENT, BY THEIR
EXPRESS TERMS, ALLOWED DARLENE TO COMPLETELY
DIVEST RON'S BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE TRUST BY
PARTIAL REVOCATION

1

RANDY PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS
COURT ON APPEAL AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL

7

THE CRIMINAL ACTS RON COMMITTED AGAINST HIS
MOTHER, DARLENE, ARE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE TRUST SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHANGES TO THE TRUST MADE
BY DARLENE IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHE DISCOVERED
RON'S CRIMINAL ACTS

11

A.

The trial court never found that the evidence of Ron's "Elder
Abuse" and "Exploitation of an Elder" against his mother was
irrelevant

11

If it is determined by this Court that the trial court found evidence
of Ron's crimes against his mother was irrelevant, the trial court
abused its discretion in making said determination, and this Court
should determine that said evidence is relevant

13

UTAH TRUST CODE SECTIONS 75-7-605 AND -606 ARE
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW AND PERSUASIVE
AUTHORITY TO THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT

16

EQUITY REQUIRES THIS COURT TO VALIDATE THE FINAL
AMENDMENT AND TO ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRUST
ESTATE ACCORDING TO THE FINAL AMENDMENT'S TERMS

21

B.

IV.

V.

i

CONCLUSION

25

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

26

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alexander v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 273 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954)
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1998)
Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190
Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 UT App 91

22-25
7-9
.passim
2

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates,
632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981)

2

Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246

2

Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, 221 P.3d 205
Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589
Groesbeckv. Groesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1997)
Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d 750

13
1, 12-13, 21
22
1, 12, 21-25

Horn v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 548 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1976)

22-25

Innerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31, 214 P.3d 854

7

Kline v. Utah Dep't of Health, 776 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

13

Leggroan v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746 (Utah 1951)

13

Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White, 2002 UT App 1,40 P.3d 1155

14

Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc, 2009 UT 44, 215 P.3d 152

7

Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193

21

Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, 992 P.2d 969

14

Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, 38 P.3d 307

7-9

iii

State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177

14

State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d404

14

State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, 975 P.2d476

7-8

State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 44 P.3d 805

14

Stevenettv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508

14

Trager v. Schwartz, 345 Mass. 653, 189 N.E.2d 509 (1963)
Utah Dep't ofTransp. v. 6200 South Assocs., 872 P.2d 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

2
14

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105(2) (2010)

16, 19

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415 (2010)

19-20

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)-(4) (2010)
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-606(1) (2010)

8, 16-19
8, 16

Rules
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(c) (2010)

12-13

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 401 (2010)

13

Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 402 (2010)

13

Other Authorities
Black's Law Dictionary 816 (7th ed. 1999)

22

Charles M. Bennett, Can you Amend that Revocable Trust? Utah Estate
Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for the Unwary, 2004 Utah Bar Journal,
available at http://webster.utahbar.org/barjournal/2004/08/
can_you_amend_that_revocable_t.html#more

6

Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-2 (1996)

14
iv

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 59 cmt. c (1959)
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 reporter's notes, cmt. b (2003)

22
23-24

Uniform Trust Code § 415, official comment

20

Uniform Trust Code § 602

17

v

CLARIFICATION OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
In his Brief of Appellee, Ron mischaracterizes the issue appealed. Ron attempts to
limit Randy's appealed issue to "[wjhether under Banks v. Means,... Flake v. Flake,... and
Hoggan v. Hoggan, ... a settlor of a revocable trust must revoke the trust" in order to
completely divest a beneficiary's interest, because of language in the trust stating that the
beneficiaries' interest are presently vested and will continue until the trust is revoked or
terminated other than by death. See Brief of the Appellee, at 6. In contrast to Ron's
statement of the issue on appeal, it should be understood that Randy is appealing the
correctness and applicability of Banks and its progeny. See Brief of Appellant, at 1. In
short, one of the main objectives of this appeal is to overturn Banks and its progeny, not to
determine the result of this controversy by reliance upon Banks,

See Brief of Appellant,

Issue I, at 14-23.
Further, the issue presented for appeal by Randy is an issue of law, as are all
subsidiary issues in this controversy. It should be remembered that this case was before the
trial court on motion for summary judgment; therefore, there are no genuine issues of
material fact, only disputes to be resolved as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FAMILY TRUST AND TRUST RESTATEMENT, BY THEIR EXPRESS
TERMS, ALLOWED DARLENE TO COMPLETELY DIVEST RON'S
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE TRUST BY PARTIAL REVOCATION
In the Brief of Appellee, and without citing any supporting authority for his position,

Ron claims the term "partial revocation" is a "novel" and "meaningless" term created by
1

Randy that "can only exist in a sphere in which revocation and amendment are coterminous
[sic] in meaning, and they are not." See Brief of Appellee, at 41-42. Further, and again
without citing any supporting legal authority, Ron seems to claim that a settlor-trustee cannot
partially revoke a trust through an instrument entitled "Amendment". While Ron attributes
the term "partial revocation" as novel, the term "partial revocation" predates Randy's Brief
of Appellant and is a term recognized by Utah courts.1
In Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 UT App 91, a settlor-trustee of a revocable trust sold two
parcels of real property that were the primary assets of the trust. Id. at ^2. After selling the
assets the settlor-trustee placed the proceeds into personal bank accounts and into personal
investments. Id. The trial court held that the relevant trust was "partially revoked" as to the
parcels of real property. Id. at ^[1. The Court of Appeals in affirming the trial courts decision
stated as follows:
The Trust's deed of conveyance and declaration (the Trust Declaration) is clear
on three matters. First, it designates [the settlor-trustee] as the sole beneficiary
of the Trust during her lifetime; second, it grants her power "to use, transfer,
contract to sell, ... convey and in every way deal in and with the said real
property ... without notice to or consent from any person"; and third, it grants
her power "to modify, amend, or revoke the Trust in whole or in part in any
manner at any time."
1 See, e.g., Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246 (Acknowledging "partial revocation" of a
trust is possible when the trust provides that the trust "may be revoked, in whole or in
part, by an instrument" if the terms of the trust are complied with strictly under the
common law or substantially under the code - further implies a quit claim deed would be
a sufficient instrument to effectuate the partial revocation had the quit claim deed
satisfied the trust's signature requirements); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country
Club Mobile Estates, 632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981) (analyzing Trager v. Schwartz, 345 Mass.
653, 189 N.E.2d 509 (1963) and determining Trager "defines the effect of a recording
requirement specified in the trust instrument as a prerequisite to the effectiveness of an
exercise of a power (partial revocation) clearly reserved in the trust instrument").

Id. at *p (emphasis added). The court then continued as follows:
[W]here no specific method of revocation is required, she may revoke the
Trust in "any ... method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of [her]
intent." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 (Supp. 2004). Where [the settlor-trustee]
sold the property of the Trust and deposited it into three subsequent personal
accounts without designating herself as trustee or the funds as trust funds, the
trial court properly found that she revoked the Trust respecting that property.
See 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 115(2002) ("Where a settlor retains the power to sell
certain property subject to a trust, and later conveys the property to someone
else, the conveyance itself is an implied revocation of the trust, since the
trustee and the beneficiary are divested of all interest in the property.").
Id. at ^4 (emphasis added).
Like Ron in the case before this court, the beneficiaries of the trust in Boulton argued
that no revocation occurred. Id. at \5. However, the court declined to presume a revocation
could only be evidenced by the limitations suggested by the beneficiaries. Id. Finally, the
beneficiaries argued that because the settlor-trustee signed her name as trustee on the sale
documents that the proceeds were intended to remain in the trust. Id. at <[[6. To this the court
stated "where the settlor-trustee retains broad powers to revoke, the settlor-trustee's
subsequent actions ... is more indicative of her intended characterization of the assets than is
the signature block on the transfer instruments." Id. Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's determination that the Trust was partially revoked as to the two
parcels of real property. Id. at ffljl, 7.
Like the trust in Boulton, the Trust Restatement granted Darlene the right to "amend
or revoke this Trust in whole or in part." See Trust Restatement (R. at 42, attached to Brief
of Appellant as Exhibit H (emphasis added)). Throughout his Brief of Appellee, Ron places

3

great emphasis on the following Trust Restatement language:

"The interest of the

beneficiaries is a present interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or
terminated." Id. at 3 (R. at 43 (emphasis added)). In addition to contending the term "partial
revocation" is a fabrication, Ron contends that such language mandates that the Trust must be
completely revoked before divesting a beneficiary's interest. See Brief of Appellee, at 26-29.
However, this provision does not contain any suggestion that the trust must be "completely"
revoked before divesting a beneficiary's interest.

In interpreting this provision it is

reasonable to refer to the section of the Trust Amendment that governs revocations and is
entitled "Revocation and Amendment" to determine how and what is necessary to revoke
"this Trust" (emphasis added).
As mentioned above, the Revocation and Amendment section of the Trust
Restatement, by its express terms, states "this Trust" (the Trust Restatement) may be
"revoked ... in whole or in part", so long as it is by "written instrument" and signed by
Darlene. See Trust Restatement, at 2 (R. at 42, attached to Brief of Appellant as Exhibit H)
(emphasis added). The Trust Restatement never contemplates or suggests that a "complete

4

revocation"2 is necessary to divest a beneficiary's interest, but rather only requires that the
Trust be revoked, while providing that the Trust may be revoked in whole or in part, by
written instrument.
In addition, nothing in the Trust Restatement distinguishes a revocation from an
amendment, or the processes necessary to effectuate them. In Banks, the court considered the
issue of whether an amendment and a revocation were the same for purposes of the Banks
trust. 2002 UT 65, %l 1. It determined that because the trust contained language stating "in
the case of a complete revocation, all the property in the trust was also to be delivered to Ms.
Banks" that "[Revocation is therefore a specific provision of the trust language and is not the
same as an amendment or modification." Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, the Patterson
Trust Restatement contains no such language or distinction, and there is no "specific
provision" applicable only to revocation. Rather, the only parameters placed on effectuating

2 Ron claims "the terms of the Family Trust and Restatement could not speak more
clearly in requiring that the termination of a beneficiary's interest may only be done
through revocation of the trust as a whole. This is not the elevation of form over
substance; it is the necessary recognition of the substance of the terms of the Family Trust
and Restatement." See Brief of Appellee, at 45. However, despite the fact the Trust
Restatement could "not speak more clearly", it is interesting to note that Ron feels it
necessary to add a clarification that the termination of a beneficiary's interest can only be
done through revocation of the trust "as a whole". Ron's position is ambiguous at best.
In actuality, the Trust Restatement makes no mention of revocation "as a whole" being
necessary to terminate a beneficiary's interest but rather only provides that beneficiaries'
interests continue until the trust is revoked and that revocation may be done in whole or in
part. Ron felt it necessary to make said clarification throughout his Brief of Appellee. If
such clarification is so key to understanding the terms of the trust, it stands to reason that
the drafter would specify such a distinction if it was truly Darlene's intent to restrict
herself from removing Ron as a beneficiary unless she "completely" revoked the "entire"
trust.
5

an "amendment or revocation", whether in whole or in part, are that the "amendment or
revocation" be by "written instrument" and signed by the testator. See Trust Restatement at 2
(R. at 42, attached to Brief of Appellant as Exhibit H). Ron has not argued, nor contested,
that the duly executed document entitled "Amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family
Protection Trust" (the Final Amendment) was not a "written instrument." Further, while Ron
attempts to distinguish a revocation from an amendment, he does so citing no factual or legal
authority, nor does Ron attempt to distinguish an amendment from a partial revocation. See
Brief of Appellee, at 27-28.
In the case before this Court, there was no valid purpose or necessity for Darlene to
"completely" revoke the Trust Restatement, rather than to modify or change the trust through
a "partial revocation"; especially given the fact that in the Trust Restatement Darlene
reserved the power "to amend or revoke the Trust in whole or in part." In the words of
Charles M. Bennett (author of the 2004 Utah Bar Journal article entitled "Can you Amend
that Revocable Trust? Utah Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for the Unwary", a Fellow
in the American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, a past chair of the Utah Estate Planning
Section, and an adjunct professor of law at the University of Utah), "an amendment that
deletes one beneficiary and adds another is a revocation of the Trust 'in part' as to the deleted
beneficiary's rights in the trust." While Darlene certainly could have effectuated the removal
of Ron as a beneficiary through a complete revocation and restatement of the Trust
Restatement, such was not the exclusive method. The plain language of the instrument
allowed Darlene to revoke "the Trust" in whole or in part to remove Ron as a beneficiary.

6

II.

RANDY PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT ON
APPEAL AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL
Contrary to Ron's repeated assertions in his Brief of Appellee, Randy properly

preserved in the trial court the issue presented for appeal. Namely, Randy preserved the issue
presented for appellate review as stated in Randy's Brief of Appellant. See Brief of
Appellant, at 1. In short, the question preserved by Randy is whether Ron is entitled to an
interest in the trust property or whether Ron was cut off by the Final Amendment (the
"Issue").
"To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial
court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App
367, ^[17; see also Innerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31, f 10; State v. Maguire,
1999 UT App 45, | 6 , 975 P.2d 476 (quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844,
847 (Utah 1998)). The District Court then "has the opportunity to rule if the following three
requirements are met: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority." Id.; see also Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc, 2009 UT 44 (raising a legal
issue during a summary judgment motion based on the undisputed facts properly provides the
court with an opportunity to rule on the issue).
Ron alleges Randy presented "unpreserved" issues, including, "[w]hether the Utah
Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by requiring only substantial compliance to
amend a revocable trust" and "[w]hether the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled
Banks by providing that a revocable trust can be amended by a settlor by any method
7

manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent." While these are points
addressed in Randy's Brief of Appellant by reference to the Utah Trust Code §§ 75-7-605
and -606, Ron fails to recognize that these are merely subparts of the Issue which was
preserved for appeal.
The Issue in large part encompasses the validity of the Banks decision and whether it
should be overturned. Randy challenges the Banks decision in part because Utah's highest
courts and the Utah Legislature have questioned the Banks decision. On appeal, the law is
the law, and the statutes are relevant. It is not violative of the so-called "preservation rule" to
present persuasive and controlling legal authority to the reviewing court. Characterizing the
presentation of legal authority as new, unpreserved issues, as Ron attempted to do, is contrary
to reason, would unnecessarily bind the reviewing court, and would not allow for effective
appellate review.
To satisfy the dictates of the preservation rule, the aforementioned Issue was raised
and preserved by Randy in his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (R. at 422-36) and his Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support (R. at 418-19, 398-411), along with Ron's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (R. at 323-97) (which sought a judgment
that the Final Amendment is void due to its complete divestiture of Ron as a beneficiary).
See Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, f 17 (holding that to preserve an issue for appeal the
issue must be raised and the trial court must be given an opportunity to rule on the issue); see
also State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, ^|6,975 P.2d 476 (quoting Badger v. Brooklyn Canal
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Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). In these respective Motions and Memorandums the
Issue was extensively briefed by both parties. Randy sought summary judgment declaring
the Final Amendment valid and that the trust property is to be distributed accordingly. (R. at
403-10,428-35). Randy sought such judgment based on, among other grounds, the language
of the Trust documents (R. at 404-08,430-33), the trustor's intent (Id), Utah trust law (R. at
403-10, 428-35), and equity (R. at 405-08, 431-33). Randy further argued that this case
should be distinguished from Banks and that Banks and its progeny should be overruled. (R.
at 408-10, 433-35).
As required by Searle, the Issue was raised with the trial court in a timely fashion, the
Issue was specifically raised, and both parties introduced relevant legal authority and
submitted supporting evidence in their motions and memoranda. See Searle, 2001 UT App
367, |17. The trial court considered Randy's and Ron's respective arguments relating to the
Issue and, on November 30, 2009, issued its Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendants' Cross
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. at 622-29). The trial court stated that the Court
had "reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting
documentation", "held a hearing on the matters", "considered all of the arguments", and were
"fully advised in the premises", before making the Ruling. (R. at 622). In this Ruling, the
trial court determined the Final Amendment was invalid and granted Ron's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. (R. at 628). Therefore, because the Issue was raised at the trial court
level and because the trial court had an opportunity to rule on the Issue, the Issue was
adequately preserved for appeal. Further, Randy showed that the issue was preserved for

9

appeal by citation to the record in his primary brief. See Brief of Appellant at 1. The Issue is
the sole issue presented for appeal and it should be reviewed as a matter of law.
As stated above, in large part the issue presented for appeal and before this Court, is
whether the case of Banks v. Means, and its progeny cases, is good law. Based on the
legislative developments, the subsequent case law, and the Utah trust law contained in
Randy's Brief, Randy's position is that Banks is no longer good law. This is an issue
presented that was clearly preserved, and the main issue Randy is asking this Court to review.
The appellate briefing process is in place to allow the parties to present the law to the
reviewing courts so the reviewing courts can determine the propriety of the decision below.
Through the briefing process, Ron has had the opportunity to respond to the law contained in
the Brief of Appellant and present counter arguments. This is especially relevant and useful
given this appeal is interlocutory in nature and an appeal from a summary judgment, thereby
requiring this court to determine whether the trial court correctly determined that Ron is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
To determine whether Banks is good law, and to determine whether Ron has an
interest in the trust property or whether he was cut off by the Final Amendment, this Court
should review all legal authority available to it, including legislation and all legal authority
presented in Randy's Brief of Appellant.

10

III. THE CRIMINAL ACTS RON COMMITTED AGAINST HIS MOTHER,
DARLENE, ARE RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE TRUST
SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHANGES TO THE
TRUST MADE BY DARLENE IMMEDIATELY AFTER SHE DISCOVERED RON'S
CRIMINAL ACTS
A.

The trial court never found that the evidence of Ron's "Elder Abuse" and
"Exploitation of an Elder" against his mother was irrelevant
Throughout Ron's brief of Appellee, he inappropriately and inaccurately asserts that

Randy's Brief of Appellant contained irrelevant evidence regarding the criminal acts Ron
committed against his mother, Darlene, immediately before Darlene caused Ron to be
removed as a beneficiary of her trust. Importantly, however, nowhere in Ron's brief did he
dispute the facts of his criminal acts as laid out in Randy's Brief of Appellant and, therefore,
only the relevance of Ron's felonious activities against his mother is at issue. The extrinsic
evidence of Ron's criminal activities was never ruled irrelevant by the trial court and such
extrinsic evidence is clearly relevant to Darlene's intent in making the final changes to her
trust.
As noted in the trial court's Ruling on Plaintiffs and Defendants' Cross Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment, Ron did file a motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Randy
Patterson based on evidentiary arguments. See Ruling, fn. 3 (R. at 625, attached to Brief of
Appellant at Exhibit C). In its Ruling, the trial court stated as follows regarding to motion to
strike:
In reviewing the Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson,
and given the parties' stipulation to limit the issues pertaining to their cross
motions for partial summary judgment and the relevant Utah appellate case law
on such issues, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the information within
the affidavit is largely irrelevant to the Court's analysis. However, the Court
11

finds that the plaintiffs motion to strike is rendered moot by the Court's ruling
on the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.
Id.
Nowhere in the Ruling, or elsewhere in the Record, did the court specifically rule that
the proffered evidence regarding Ron's criminal actions against his mother was irrelevant.
At best, the court stated that information contained in Randy's Supplemental and Corrected
Affidavit was "largely" irrelevant, without specifying what evidence in the Affidavit was
being referred to. Further, the court never made a ruling on the issue because it found Ron's
motion to strike "moot" due to its ruling on Ron's motion for partial summary judgment. The
trial court even went so far in a later footnote as to imply the relevancy of the information
regarding Ron's criminal acts in an appeal situation when it stated the following:
The Court notes that the defendants' inclusion of additional facts pertaining to
Darlene Patterson's intent and the equity of a finding that the Final
Amendment is invalid are largely irrelevant to the Court's analysis of the
issues under existing Utah appellate case law and the Court's interpretation of
the Family Trust's plain language. See Banks ... Flake ... Hoggan. While the
defendants have requested the Court disregard this case law as bad precedent,
the Court declines such request. This Court is bound to follow the precedent
of the Utah appellate courts and the defendants' attempt to change this
precedent is more appropriate on appeal.
Id. at fn. 5.
While the veracity of Ron's criminal conduct was undisputed and, thus, should have
been considered on summary judgment, it is only irrelevant if such facts are ignored and
Banks is blindly affirmed.
Further, even if the admissibility of the evidence regarding Ron's felonious activities
is in controversy, Randy complied with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure rule 24(e), to the
12

extent possible, by citing to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(e) provides "If reference is made to evidence the
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at
which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected." As mentioned above,
this appeal is from an interlocutory ruling on summary judgment motion, and the "evidence
in controversy" was neither received nor rejected. Further, the accuracy of these facts was
never disputed. Therefore, to satisfy Rule 24(e) Randy referred to the record where the
evidence was identified. See Brief of Appellant, at 9-10.
B.

If it is determined by this Court that the trial court found evidence of Ron's crimes
against his mother was irrelevant, the trial court abused its discretion in making said
determination, and this Court should determine that said evidence is relevant
As stated in Ron's Brief of Appellee, "Utah trust law has always focused its inquiry

on the intent of the trustor, Leggroan v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749
(1951)." See Brief of Appellee, at 44; see also Flake, 71 P.3d at 594; Kline v. Utah Dep't of
Health, 776 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, testator intent is a key inquiry and,
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence, any evidence relating to or showing testator intent is
necessarily relevant, and meets Utah's minimalistic relevance standard.
According to Utah law, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401; see also Ferguson
v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49. Relevant evidence is admissible; irrelevant evidence
is not admissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. Further, the standard for determining the relevancy of
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evidence is "very low," and even evidence with the "slightest probative value" is relevant.
State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, \3A\ State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,ffif12,16 (quoting Edward L.
Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-2 (1996)); see also State v. Colwell, 2000
UT 8, If 27; Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109,fflf26-27.
"The question of whether evidence is admissible can be either a question of discretion,
which [appellate courts] review for abuse of discretion, or a question of law, which [appellate
courts] review for correctness. State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, ^|29. When a trial court is
required to balance factors to determine the admissibility of evidence, the appropriate
standard of review is generally abuse of discretion or reasonability. Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v.
White, 2002 UT App 1, ^[12; see also Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80,
^}8,977 P.2d 508. If error is found, reversal is appropriate in those cases where, after review
of all the evidence, it appears that 'absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a
different result would have been reached.'" Id. (quoting UtahDep'tofTransp. v. 6200 South
Assocs., 872 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted)).
Utah case law is clear, as cited by Ron, in making the testator's intent a key inquiry
and the focus of Utah courts in interpreting a trust document. Therefore, any evidence
relating to or corroborating the testator's intent is appropriately considered in the court's
analysis and interpretation of the relevant trust documents. Consideration of Darlene's intent
is relevant in determining Ron's claimed entitlement to a share of the trust property.
Fortunately, Darlene made her intent very clear through her execution of the Final
Amendment that she felt she had provided sufficiently for Ron during her life and that upon
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her death she desired that Ron would take none of the trust property.3 See Final Amendment,
at 2 (R. at 59, attached to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit I) ("I [Darlene] have intentionally not
provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already
properly provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate").
While it would be difficult for Darlene to state her intent any clearer, her intent to
remove Ron as a beneficiary of the Trust, is further corroborated by the undisputed evidence
that the Final Amendment was executed on May 30, 2006, soon after it was discovered by
Darlene that Ron had unlawfully used Darlene's credit card without authorization to make
personal purchases and that Ron had stolen $52,936.53 from Darlene; acts which ultimately
led to Ron's later conviction of the felony crimes of "Elder Abuse" and "Exploitation of an
Elder". See Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson atffi[4-5,(R. at 474,
attached to Brief of Appellant as Exhibit E).
It is a fact of consequence that Darlene intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary of the
Trust. Pursuant to Utah law, all evidence that has any tendency to make the existence of said
fact of consequence more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence is
relevant, is admissible, and should be considered by this court in its determination of Ron's

3 Ron would have this Court believe that because Darlene did not sign a "revocation of
trust" and afterwards form a new trust incorporating the provisions of the trust as
amended by the Final Amendment, that her intent when she signed the Final Amendment
on May 30, 2006, was not to remove Ron as a beneficiary of her trust estate and that
because she did not sign a revocation and new trust that she did not "serious [ly]
contemplate] her decision, despite the fact she made an appointment with an attorney,
instructed the attorney to remove Ron as a beneficiary, and signed a Final Amendment
evidencing such. See Brief of Appellee at 49.
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entitlement, or lack thereof, to his claimed share of the trust property. Ron abused and
exploited his mother, Darlene. As a result Darlene intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary
of her trust. If this Court determines that the trial court found evidence of Ron's felonious
criminal activities against his mother was irrelevant or inadmissible, this Court should
determine the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in doing so.
IV.

UTAH TRUST CODE SECTIONS 75-7-605 AND -606 ARE DETERMINATIVE
PROVISIONS OF LAW AND PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY TO THE ISSUE
BEFORE THIS COURT
As briefed by Ron, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105(2) states, "Except as specifically

provided in this chapter, the terms of a trust prevail over any provision of the chapter except:
..." (emphasis added). Ron interprets this provision to mean that because the Trust
Restatement has a term that addresses revocation or amendment, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605
is wholly inapplicable and, therefore, not determinative of the issue before this court. See
Brief of Appellee at 11-12, 39-40.
As stated in the Uniform Trust Code's4 Prefatory Note, "[m]ost of the Uniform Trust
Code consists of default rules that apply only if the terms of the trust fail to address or
insufficiently cover a particular issue." See Uniform Trust Code, Prefatory Note (2005).
According to the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605, the Trust Restatement failed
to address or "sufficiently" cover revocation and amendment, as applicable to the Issue,
because the terms of the Trust Restatement did not provide an exclusive method for
revocation and amendment.

4 The Uniform Trust Code has been enacted in the State of Utah.
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 states, in relevant part, as follows:
(3) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the
trust; or
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided
in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by:
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or
specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed according to
the terms of the trust; or
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the
settlor's intent.
(Emphasis added).
The Uniform Trust Code's Official Comment explained this section's application and
purpose as follows:
Under subsection ([3]), the settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust by
substantial compliance with the method specified in the terms of the trust or by
a later will or codicil or any other method manifesting clear and convincing
evidence of the settlor's intent. Only if the method specified in the terms of the
trust is made exclusive is use of the other methods prohibited. Even then, a
failure to comply with a technical requirement, such as required notarization,
may be excused as long as compliance with the method specified in the terms
of the trust is otherwise substantial.
See Uniform Trust Code § 602, Official Comment (2005) (emphasis added).
Therefore, pursuant to the plain language of the statute and the above-emphasized
language, the terms of the trust only override the provisions of this section if there is a
declared method of revocation and amendment in the terms of the trust and such declared
method is made explicitly exclusive by the trust's terms. Id. As noted above, even if there is
a declared method made explicitly exclusive, revocation and amendment may be effectuated
by substantial compliance with the trust's terms. Id.
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Clearly, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 contemplates application to a trust already
containing revocation or amendment terms. The language allowing "substantial compliance"
with a term, presupposes that a term already exists to substantially comply with. Further,
subsection (b) contemplates application to all trusts, including those with express revocation
or amendment terms, exclusive revocation or amendment terms, non-exclusive revocation or
amendment terms, and no revocation or amendment terms. Therefore, Ron's argument that
this section is completely inapplicable because the Trust Restatement contains a provision
addressing revocation and amendment must fail.
Rather, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 is applicable to the Issue before this Court and
should be considered in this Court's analysis and interpretation of the Trust Restatement and
the Final Amendment. Darlene's Trust Restatement contains a section entitled "Revocation
and Amendment", providing, in relevant part, as follows:
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this Trust in whole or in part. Such
amendment or revocation shall be by written instrument and shall be effective
upon the signing thereof by me without notice to any successor Trustee.
See Trust Restatement, Art. II (R. at 42, attached to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit H).
Because the Trust Restatement contains terms governing modification of its terms, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a)-(b), the Trust can be modified by "substantial
compliance" with said terms and, because the Trust Restatement does not make any method
of modification the exclusive method, the Trust can be modified by "any other method
manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent." See Utah Code Ann. § 757-605(3)(a)-(b).
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Therefore, it is specifically provided in Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a)-(b), in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105, that the cited trust code provisions are
applicable to and govern revocable trusts, even if said revocable trust contains terms
governing modification. While Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a)-(b) may not "override" the
terms of the Trust, it certainly coexists with the terms of the Trust to resolve troublesome
ambiguities.
Because the Trust Restatement contains terms governing revocation or amendment,
pursuant to Utah trust law, Darlene was entitled to modify her trust by substantially
complying with the express modification terms or by any other method evidence her clear
intent to modify the trust. Darlene did this through her execution of the Final Amendment.
In the alternative, even if this Court determines the Trust Restatement sufficiently
covers the issue of revocation and amendment and concludes that its terms completely
override Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605, this Court may still exercise its discretion in giving
effect to Darlene's intent in executing the Final Amendment through its reformation powers
granted by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-415. It states, in its entirety, as follows:
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform
the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing
evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected
by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.
This provision is a mandatory rule as per Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105(2)(d), and this power
prevails over any terms of the Trust Restatement. Reformation allows the court to modify the
terms of a trust, as necessary, to effectuate the testator's intent.

19

If the Final Amendment is declared invalid, the terms of the Trust Restatement would
misstate Darlene's true intention and, therefore, constitute a mistake of expression. Utah
Code Ann. § 75-7-415 applies to mistakes of expression. "A mistake of expression occurs
when the terms of the trust misstate the settlor's intention, fail to include a term that was
intended to be included, or include a term that was not intended to be included." See
Uniform Trust Code § 415, official comment (2005). It is clear and convincing that Darlene
intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary of her trust estate by her execution of the Final
Amendment.

The fully executed Final Amendment states, in relevant part, "I have

intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since
I have already properly provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate."
See Final Amendment at 2 (R. at 59, attached to Brief of Appellant at Exhibit I) (emphasis
added). To effectuate Darlene's intent, this Court must determine the Final Amendment to
be valid or reform the terms of the Trust Restatement to remove Ron as a beneficiary.
In short, if this Court determines that the Final Amendment was invalid due to "Banks
deficiencies", it should determine that Darlene's execution of the Final Amendment
(especially given the surrounding circumstances of Ron's criminal abuse and exploits against
Darlene) was clear and convincing evidence of her intent to remove Ron as a beneficiary of
the Patterson Trust. After making such a determination, this Court should then exercise its
statutory power of reformation and reform the Trust Restatement to reflect Darlene's clear
intent.
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V.

EQUITY REQUIRES THIS COURT TO VALIDATE THE FINAL
AMENDMENT AND TO ORDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE TRUST ESTATE
ACCORDING TO THE FINAL AMENDMENT'S TERMS
Under the circumstances of the case before this Court, it would be inequitable in every

respect for the court to award Ron an interest in the trust estate other than that which was left
to him under the Final Amendment, especially given the fact Darlene made her intentions to
remove Ron as a trust beneficiary unquestionably clear.
As argued in Randy's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Counter Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 10-11 (R. at 407-08), under general contract law, "an
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract
so expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to
be given it." Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^[19.
Darlene Patterson discovered Ron's criminal activities and then prepared and executed
the Final Amendment, which was clearly intended to remove Ron as a beneficiary of
Darlene's Trust. Ron continues his misconduct even after Darlene's death, by asking Utah
courts to disregard his prior criminal acts, ignore the changes his mother rightfully made to
the Family Trust by way of the Final Amendment, and interpret the trust language without
regard to his mother's final modification and expressed intent.
Unfortunately, the trial court's decision to apply Banks and its progeny has the effect
of ignoring Ron's misconduct and rewarding his wrongdoing. Banks, Flake, andHoggan
should be overturned. After much judicial, legislative, and scholarly questioning, now is the
time to do so. The Court in Hoggan noted as follows:
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Language asserting that beneficiaries have a "present interest" or a "presently
vested interest" in a trust has apparently become common within trusts drafted
in Utah. We suspect that drafters include such language with the intent of
warding off potential challenges to the trust on grounds that it is illusory. See
Banks, 2002 UT 65, PP 12-13, 52 P.3d 1190. Unfortunately, such phrases have
been the focus of recent litigation and have the potential to produce results not
within the contemplation of the drafters of trusts or their clients. Indeed, the
potential for confusion is great because in many living trusts, like the one at
issue here, the beneficiaries have no immediate right of possession or
enjoyment of the trust property. In such instances, the insertion of language
proclaiming that the beneficiaries have a "present interest" simply contradicts
the operative terms of the trust. See Black's Law Dictionary 816 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining a present interest as "[a] property interest in which the privilege of
possession or enjoyment is present and not merely future; an interest entitling
the holder to immediate possession"). Similarly, trusts in which the settlor
retains the right to amend or revoke the instrument do not convey "presently
vested rights" to beneficiaries because their interests are contingent upon the
settlor not amending or revoking the trust. See id. at 1557 (defining the term
"vested" as a "consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not
contingent; unconditional; absolute").
The impetus for including such phrases within trust agreements appears to
originate, unfortunately, from our holding that a trust is invalid unless the
beneficiary's interest vests during the settlor's lifetime. Alexander v. Zion's Sav.
Bank & Trust Co., 2 Utah 2d 317, 273 P.2d 173, 174 (Utah 1954), affd on
reh'g, 4 Utah 2d 90,287 P.2d 665 (Utah 1955). But see Restatement (Second)
of Trusts § 59 cmt. c (1959) ("A provision in the terms of the trust under which
interests of the beneficiaries do not vest until a future time is not invalid unless
such interests may not vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities ...
."). In an apparent effort to uphold prior precedent while at the same time
avoiding the invalidation of countless trusts intended to serve as substitutes for
wills, we later said that such trusts created vested interests that were subject to
divestment. Horn v. First Sec. BankofUtah} N.A., 548 P.2d 1265,1267 (Utah
1976). Although the term "vested interest subject to divestment" is more of an
oxymoron than a meaningful legal term, over the decades this phrase has been
used by this court to uphold trusts in which the beneficiaries' interests were not
vested under the traditional meaning of the term. See Banks, 2002 UT 65, P 13,
52 P.3d 1190; Groesbeckv. Groesbeck (In re Estate ofGroesbeck), 935 P.2d
1255, 1257-58 (Utah 1997).
We hereby disavow the use of this phrase and the antiquated and now widely
discredited rule articulated in Alexander that gave rise to it. We agree with the

analysis of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which advocates the
abandonment of such confusing and disingenuous terminology in favor of an
open recognition that there is no requirement that a beneficiary's interest be
either present or vested:
Issues are obscured and litigation invited by confusing or unsound dicta
often found in opinions that attempt to explain why something is or is not a
present trust. Asking whether something is a "trust" or a "mere agency" is
at best question begging. So is the suggestion in many opinions that, in
order to uphold a disposition, a court must find a "present" or "vested"
interest in one or more beneficiaries other than the settlor; in fact these
statements are untrue unless they mean, simply, "presently existing"
interests. And assertions that a settlor must relinquish "dominion and
control" over the property are merely erroneous dicta.
These statements confuse the issue, and maybe the reader, ignoring the
reality that these very courts regularly and properly find valid trusts where
settlors have retained complete control, and where the other beneficiaries
usually, if drafting is competent, have only future interests that are not only
defeasible (by revocation or amendment) but also "contingent" upon
surviving the settlor and maybe other events as w e l l . . . .
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 reporter's notes, cmt. b (2003).
Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, fn 2. (emphasis added). Thus, this Court has previously acknowledged
that the language upon which Ron relies ("The interest of the beneficiaries is a present
interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated"5) "produce[s] results
not within the contemplation of the drafters of trusts or their clients", is included in trusts for
the purpose of "warding off potential challenges to the trust on grounds that it is illusory",
"originate[s], unfortunately, from [the Utah Supreme Court's] holding that a trust is invalid
unless the beneficiary's interest vests during the settlor's lifetime", is "oxymoron[ic]", and is

5 Ron argues throughout his Brief of Appellee that the language "shall continue until this
Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death" is not necessary to achieve the
purpose of preventing a trust from being deemed illusory, however, the Hoggan footnote
is referring to a clause in the Hoggan trust containing such language and the Hoggan
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expressly "disavowed]" by this Court. Id. This Court has already acknowledged that Banks
only makes sense in regard to the illusory trust doctrine and this Court's 1954 Alexander
ruling that a trust is invalid unless a beneficiary's interest vests during the testator's lifetime.
This Court acknowledged in Hoggan that the troublesome language at issue has been used
unnecessarily only for purposes of avoiding potential challenges to the validity of the trust
based on the illusory trust doctrine announced in Alexander and further developed in Horn.
However, in Hoggan, it was unnecessary to explicitly overrule Banks because, as pointed out
by Ron in his Brief of Appellee at 33, "the rule of Banks did not apply because Jack Hoggan
had not been completely divested of his interest in the trust" and, therefore, the amendment
was validated and the intent of the testator was followed. However, the Patterson Trust
dispute provides this Court the opportunity to overturn Banks, distance itself from the
u

oxymoron[ic]" and troublesome language provided to the legal practitioner community in

Horn, and conform Utah trust law to the current state of the law as set forth in the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
This Court should finally and completely overrule Banks, distance itself from its
linguistic suggestion in Horn, and order the distribution of Darlene's estate pursuant to the
Final Amendment.

Additionally, this Court can resolve and prevent the unintended

consequences that have arisen and will continue to arise in countless Utah trusts due to this
Court's application of the illusory trust doctrine outlined in Alexander and justified in Horn.
This Court has already taken the first step by explicitly overruling Alexander and

court makes no such distinction. See Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, fl 1.
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"disavowing]" the use of the phrase "vested subject to divestment" originally suggested in
Horn. See Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, fn. 2. Now is the time for this Court to take the next step
and specifically overrule Banks, which is a creature of Alexander's illusory trust doctrine and
the linguistic requirements enunciated in Horn. To do otherwise unquestionably "exalts form
over substance" as it would completely disregard Darlene's intent and justification in
executing her Final Amendment, and produce an inequitable result.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Denying Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be
reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to uphold and
enforce the Final Amendment.

DATED this 5 J day of August, 2010
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

fames C. J6nKins
Attorney for Plaintiff, Petitioner, and
Appellant
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